| Abstract: |
We present interpretations of type systems for secure
information flow in Hoare logic, complementing previous encodings in
relational program logics. We first treat the imperative language
IMP, extended by a simple procedure call mechanism. For this
language we consider base-line non-interference in the style of
Volpano et al. and the flow-sensitive type system by Hunt and Sands.
In both cases, we show how typing
derivations may be used to automatically generate proofs in the
program logic that certify the absence of illicit flows. We then add
instructions for object creation and manipulation, and derive
appropriate proof rules for base-line non-interference. As a
consequence of our work, standard verification technology may be
used for verifying that a concrete program satisfies the
non-interference property.
The present proof development represents an update of the
formalisation underlying our paper [CSF 2007]
and is intended to resolve any ambiguities that may be present in
the paper.
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